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Abstract
Although ample research has shown that decisions may cause regret and that the anticipation of regret may inﬂuence decision-
making, this previous research was largely limited to hypothetical choices with student participants. The current research replicates
and extends these ﬁndings for real life lottery participation decisions in non-student samples. Four studies are reported in which two
lotteries in the Netherlands, the Postcode Lottery and the National State Lottery, were compared. The State Lottery is a traditional
lottery in which one has to buy a ticket with a number printed on it. In the Postcode Lottery, ones postcode is the ticket number,
and hence even if not participating one may still ﬁnd out that one would have won had one played. As our research shows, this
particular feedback that is present in the Postcode Lottery but absent in the State Lottery inﬂuences the level of anticipated post-
decisional regret, and moderates the inﬂuence that anticipated regret has on lottery participation. Study 1, 100 street interviews,
conﬁrmed our expectations that the Postcode Lottery may elicit regret. Study 2 found under controlled conditions, that people
anticipate more regret over not playing when there is feedback about the neighbors winning a prize in the Postcode Lottery than in
the State Lottery. However, when this feedback is absent they anticipate equal amounts of regret over not playing. Study 3 rep-
licated these ﬁndings for regret, while showing that the two lotteries do not diﬀer with respect to envy and jealousy, emotions that
might also be invoked in this context. Study 4 validated that, as we predicted, anticipations of post-decisional regret inﬂuence
decisions to play the Postcode lottery, but not the State Lottery. These ﬁndings demonstrate the external and discriminant validity of
anticipated regret for decision-making, and indicate its pragmatic relevance. The implications or recent developments in regret
research are discussed.
 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Gambling is one of the purest forms of decision be-
havior as the monetary outcomes and the associated
probabilities are central, and the choices can be readily
modeled mathematically. In many other of lifes
decisions the probabilities of the diﬀerent outcomes and
the values placed on those outcomes are much more
ambiguous. To overcome this, normative decision the-
orists often model real-life decisions as if they were a
gamble or a lottery. An often-heard criticism, however,
is that normative theory reduces decision-making to
gambling. As a consequence many features of the deci-
sion context are overlooked, and normative decision
theory does not fare well in predicting real life decisions.
Interestingly, however, it also does not predict gambling
behavior very well (e.g., Gilovich, 1983; Shapira &
Venezia, 1992; Wagenaar, 1988).
Because of this limited predictive value, researchers
have searched for other factors that may inﬂuence de-
cision behavior and that may account for deviations
from the normative model, one of them being emotion.
The emotion that seems most relevant in the context of
decision-making is that of regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes &
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www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdpSugden, 1982). Of course, other emotions are relevant
for decision-making as well, such as worry, fear, hap-
piness, and elation. These emotions, however, may also
occur in absence of a decision, since they are related to
aspects of outcomes or to uncertainty. Regret is directly
linked to the choice or decision at hand. Research has
documented many instances in which regret may impact
behavioral decision-making (for a review see, Zeelen-
berg, 1999). In this article we use recent knowledge
about the psychology of regret, obtained in descriptive
decision research, and return to the more traditional
study of gambling decisions. In particular, we investi-
gate the role of anticipated future regret in lottery par-
ticipation decisions. Based on developments in regret
research we expect regret to only exert an inﬂuence for
lotteries that are designed in such a way that they have
the potency to evoke severe regret. That is, we predict
that the inﬂuence of regret on gambling decisions is
conditional on speciﬁc lottery characteristics, rather
than being uniform on lottery participation in general.
Support for this prediction would not only attest to the
consequences of regret aversion in real life decisions, but
also point out speciﬁc conditions upon which regret
aversion works. In addition, we predict that it is the
anticipation of regret rather than other, related emo-
tions in the context of lottery play, such as envy and
jealousy, that accounts for the decision-making eﬀects.
Hence the potential contribution of our present re-
search is that it provides a ‘‘full-cycle’’ approach to the
study of regret (Cialdini, 1980). Using a full-cycle ap-
proach may overcome some of the critique that decision
research is mainly epiphenomenal and artiﬁcial. The
full-cycle approach holds that one starts with natural
observation, which provides the input for controlled ex-
perimentation. The outcomes of these can then be tested
in real life, using again observation or ﬁeld experimen-
tation. This may of course result in further experimen-
tation. In particular, because in real life other aspects of
the decision situation, which often are not considered in
the laboratory, play a role, and these aspects need to be
identiﬁed and controlled for. This, in its turn, may stim-
ulate new theorizing and deepens the original insights.
Thus, real life generalization of principles that have been
proven worthwhile in laboratory research is useful for
gaining understanding of how people really make deci-
sions, and for enriching decision-making theory.
Before we discuss this potential role of regret in lot-
tery play, and before reporting on four empirical studies
that test it, let us now turn to current insights in the
psychology of regret.
Regret
Regret is a negative, cognitively based emotion that
we experience when realizing or imagining that our
present situation would have been better, had we acted
diﬀerently. It is an unpleasant feeling, associated with
self-blame, the wish to undo the regretted event and a
strong tendency to kick oneself. The core element of
regret is cognitive in the sense that in order to experience
regret one needs to compare the current state of aﬀairs
with what it would have been had one decided diﬀer-
ently. This comparative aspect is central in regret theory
(Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), a theory of deci-
sion-making under uncertainty that assumes that deci-
sion makers anticipate the experience of regret and take
it into account when making decisions. According to
regret theory, people can anticipate emotions such as
regret, because they compare possible outcomes of a
choice with what the outcomes would have been, had a
diﬀerent choice been made. The decision maker antici-
pates to experience regret when the foregone outcome
would have been better and rejoicing when the foregone
outcome would have been worse. Thus, the tendency to
avoid negative post-decisional emotions such as regret
and self-recrimination, and to strive for positive feelings
and emotions such as rejoicing and elation, are assumed
to be important determinants of individual decision-
making.
When, for some reason, one cannot compare the
outcome of the chosen alternative to that of rejected
alternatives, regret is not likely to occur and hence not
likely to be anticipated. As a consequence, resolution of
both the chosen and the non-chosen alternatives became
a central element of regret research, in line with Bells
(1983, p. 1165) proposal that the eﬀect of expected
feedback ‘‘is the predicted phenomenon on which ex-
perimentation should be concentrated.’’ That research
has shown that manipulations of feedback information
about the non-chosen alternatives inﬂuences the extent
to which people experience regret or its positive coun-
terpart (Ritov & Baron, 1995) or more general outcome
satisfaction (Boles & Messick, 1995; Inman, Dyer, & Jia,
1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). It also dem-
onstrated that decision-makers do indeed make choices
that shield them from possible regret-causing feedback
on foregone alternatives (Guthrie, 1999; Josephs, Lar-
rick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; Larrick & Boles, 1995;
Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg,
Beattie, Van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996).
Clearly, on the basis of the available data, regret
seems to be a force to be reckoned with in decision-
making. One may still doubt, however, the relevance of
regret for real-life decisions, as the studies so far have
mostly adopted a scenario methodology in which stu-
dent participants make hypothetical choices. In addi-
tion, to our knowledge, the few available studies on the
role of regret in real-life decision-making (Inman &
McAlister, 1994; Van Empelen, Kok, Jansen, & Hoebe,
2001), have left the question unanswered whether the
inﬂuence of regret indeed depends on the expected
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tives.
In the present research we test for such anticipated
regret eﬀects in real-life behavior, namely in lottery play.
Lottery participation decisions are frequently made.
Moreover, these decisions may have an enormous im-
pact on ones life. This impact may not only stem from
winning the lottery, because the huge amount of money
may change ones life radically, but also from not win-
ning the lottery, as the following tragedy demonstrates.
In April 1995, a man took his own life after missing out
on a £2 million price in the British National Lottery. He
did so after discovering that the numbers he always se-
lected, 14, 17, 22, 24, 42, and 47 were that weeksw i n -
ning combination. On this particular occurrence,
however, he had forgotten to renew his ﬁve-week ticket
on time. The ticket had expired the previous Saturday.
Let us now discuss more systematic research eﬀorts that
have argued for a role of regret in lottery play. We will
also link the concept of anticipated regret to feedback
information that may be provided by the lottery.
‘‘It Could Have Been You’’: Regret and lottery play
The realization that one has missed a large prize be-
cause one decided not to participate in a lottery can
clearly be awfully regretful. Playing the lottery may
hence be a manifestation of regret aversion, as has been
suggested before (e.g., Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; Wolfson
& Briggs, 2002; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). Landman
and Petty (2000) describe how counterfactual thinking
and the ensuing regret may contribute to lottery play and
how counterfactual thinking is exploited in order to
market lotteries. One strategy is that lotteries prompt
consumers to think about the possibility of winning and
about the pain they may feel when forgoing a win. An
example is a commercial with the following song: ‘‘It
could have been you, countin the dough... But what
can I say? You just didnt play. It could have been you’’
(p. 307). Another illuminating regret evoking advertise-
ment is described by Clotfelter and Cook (1991):
A farmer is shown holding an instant game ticket. It blows out
of his hand into the nearby cow pasture. He looks around, but
is never able to ﬁnd it. Several days later a luxurious stretch
limo drives by his house, with one of this cows riding in the
back seat. We are shown his dismay and regret when he realizes
that his cow won the jackpot that would have belonged to him
if he had been more careful. (p. 231)
‘‘It Would Have Been You’’: The Dutch Postcode Lottery
Encouraging people to counterfactualize about pos-
sible wins and near misses is only one way to exploit
them. The Dutch Postcode Lottery has found a way that
may even be more eﬃcient in persuading consumers to
participate and to continue playing. This lottery is
named after their speciﬁc procedure of selecting winners.
The winning numbers are based on randomly drawn
postcodes. A Dutch postcode is a unique combination of
four numbers and two letters (e.g., 5037 ND), which
denotes a speciﬁc group of adjacent addresses in a
neighborhood. The complete postcode is normally
shared by a group of 25 addresses in one single street. In
some cases, especially in small villages with a limited
number of houses in one street, one postcode may ac-
tually cover up to three streets (but always with a
maximum of 25 addresses).
1
There is a variety of prizes to be won in this lottery,
but the most important one is the weekly Street Prize.
For this prize a random postcode is drawn and everyone
with this postcode receives 12,500 per lottery ticket. By
chance one of the ticket holders in that postcode area
also obtains a brand new BMW. In addition, monthly
the Postcode Jackpot is selected on the basis of a postal
code. This prize may run up to 14,000,000, 7,000,000
for the winner and 7,000,000 ( 1 $1) for the neighbors
with the same postcode who also hold a ticket. There are
also two big annual prizes, the ZomerKanjer (Summer
Whopper) and the PostcodeKanjer (Postcode Whopper)
that are allocated to randomly drawn postcodes and
shared among the ticket owners.
The crucial aspect of this lottery, for our present
purposes, is that it provides non-players with feedback
about what they would have won, had they played the
lottery. Namely, when one does not play and ones
postcode is drawn, one knows that one would have won,
had one played the lottery. This particular feedback is
absent in most other lotteries. Hence the possibility to
experience regret over not playing is a fairly unique
characteristic of the Postcode Lottery. The organizers of
the Postcode Lottery, of course, also realize the power
of regret. Trying to persuade people to play this lottery,
they state in their advertisements: ‘‘Dont you have any
tickets? Then your neighbors will win everything. So
make sure that you buy some now.’’ In their direct mail
1 Interestingly, this speciﬁc information about ones postcode does
not seem to be common knowledge. Before, we were not aware of the
exact number of addresses that one shares the postcode with, and
contacted the postal service to ﬁnd this out. An informal survey
revealed that neither the students nor the colleagues in either of our
departments were aware of this information. A more formal survey of
100 people (50 males and 50 females, age ranged from 14 to 77,
Mage ¼ 39, SD ¼ 17) who were approached on the street and were
asked to indicate the number of addresses that share a speciﬁc
postcode resulted in a mean estimate of 126.75 (SD ¼ 310:90). The
estimates ranged from 2 to 2000 (only 5 provided the correct answer),
indicating that people in general have no clue about this number. Also,
the web site of the lottery (www.postcodeloterij.nl) does not mention
this, although it is clearly relevant information. For that matter, it is
also interesting to note that this web site does not provide any
information about the probabilities of winning in the lottery (see also
Shapira & Venezia, 1992; Wagenaar, 1988).
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it feels when you miss an amount of at least 2 million by
just an inch. Because seeing a multimillion prize fall on
your own address, but winning nothing since you did
not buy a ticket, that is something you do not want to
experience.’’ We argue that this speciﬁc aspect of the
postcode lottery, the fact that one may obtain feedback
about missed opportunities to win millions of Euros,
actually triggers the anticipation of regret, much like the
feedback manipulations in the studies referred to earlier.
It is important to note here that there is a class of
lotteries in which a similar kind of feedback may be
present. This is the type of lotteries in which one picks
the numbers to play with oneself. Such as in the British
National Lottery example described earlier. Note that
the relation between anticipated regret and the potential
increased urge to play in such lotteries are not just of
‘‘academic’’ relevance. Clotfelter and Cook (1991, p.
231) noted a lottery using the following slogan: ‘‘Dont
let your number win without you’’. On Wednesday 5
February 1997 the British National Lottery introduced a
second weekly draw (The lottery itself—the Saturday
draw—started on Saturday 19 November 1994). When
the Wednesday draw was going to be introduced a
group of members of the UK parliament (MPs) had
signed an early day motion requesting that Camelot (the
company that runs the lottery) avoid using numbers 1–
49 for its midweek draw beginning in February
(Guardian, November 23, 1996). The MPs argued that
players who choose the same set of numbers each Sat-
urday might feel obliged to enter the Wednesday draw
as well fearing regret in case they miss out on a win with
‘‘their’’ regular numbers. Camelot said it would ignore
the motion as players are ‘‘responsible people and make
their own decisions.’’ The attempt failed and the same
numbers are used (Peter Ayton, personal communica-
tion, October 31, 2002).
Wolfson and Briggs (2002) studied this particular
occurrence in the British lottery industry and found
support for the notion that anticipated regret inﬂuences
lottery play. They found that people playing with a ﬁxed
set of numbers on Saturday were more likely to play in
the Wednesday draw as well. Unfortunately, regret was
not assessed in this study, and hence the hypothesis that
this behavior was caused by the anticipation of regret
could not be tested directly. Moreover, the main result
that people who play with ﬁxed numbers were more
likely to enter the Wednesday lottery was confounded
by the fact that these people were overall more likely to
play (i.e., they were also more likely to play every week
in the Saturday lottery). Of course anticipated regret
may account for this, but also numerous other factors
may do so. In addition, it has been found that gamblers
in the British National Lottery report that using the
same lottery numbers increases the likelihood of win-
ning (Wood, Griﬃths, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2002).
Years earlier, in the late 1980s, the state of Michigan
oﬀered a lottery called ‘‘The Zinger,’’ that also had a
very clear regret inducing feature (Rick Larrick, per-
sonal communication, March 31, 2003). The set up of
the lottery was as follows: When buying a lottery ticket
for the regular Michigan lottery, one automatically re-
ceived a set of numbers for a secondary lottery, the
Zinger. An extra $1 payment was needed to activate the
Zinger numbers. The winning numbers of these lotteries
were reported next to each other, so that one would
always ﬁnd out if one would have won in the Zinger.
The idea was of course that players would use the op-
portunity to play the Zinger as well and thereby avoid
the regret of ﬁnding out that they missed out on a big
win.
Importantly, there is a crucial diﬀerence between the
British National Lottery and The Zinger on the one
hand, and the Postcode Lottery on the other hand.
Feedback in the ﬁrst two lotteries is limited to people
who have actually already played with a ﬁxed set of
numbers (in case of the British Lottery) or who already
play the regular lottery (in case of The Zinger), while
feedback in the Postcode Lottery is relevant to non-
players as well. Thus, in the ﬁrst two lotteries one could
escape the regret by simply not entering the lottery at all,
whereas feedback in the Postcode Lottery is inescapable
even for people who do not play or have never played at
all.
Moreover, an additional component that is present in
the Postcode Lottery, but not necessarily in the other
lotteries is that in the Postcode Lottery one has to live
with the winners next door (although they may win so
much that they decide to move out). This brings in an
element of social comparison, a factor that has been
shown capable of amplifying regret (Boles & Messick,
1995). Social comparison may also stimulate other
emotions, such as envy and jealousy (Salovey, 1991),
when the neighbors rather than ‘‘we’’ win in the Post-
code lottery, and it is thus crucial to establish that an-
ticipated regret rather than these other emotions have
the predicted eﬀects on decision-making.
2
Overview of the current research
In this article we investigate peoples reactions to and
motivations for playing in the Postcode Lottery. In order
to do so, we compare the Postcode Lottery to the other
big lottery in the Netherlands, the National State Lot-
tery. The lotteries are comparable in the sense that both
are big national lotteries with prizes that easily run into
millions of euros. Also both lotteries have frequent
shows broadcasted on National Television during which
2 We thank Rick Larrick for pointing this out.
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our purpose is the feedback structure of the two lotteries,
since lottery numbers in the State lottery are randomly
assigned and unique to participants (one simply buys a
ticket with a number printed on it), rather than person-
alized and shared as in the Postcode Lottery. Thus,
knowing the winning numbers in the Postcode lottery
should be more conducive to regret, and this regret
should promote behavioral intentions to participate.
Four studies were conducted to tests the above pre-
dictions. Study 1 investigated what would be the domi-
nant emotional reaction when ones postcode is the
winning postcode, but one has failed to participate in
the lottery. Studies 2 and 3 tested whether the speciﬁc
structure of the Postcode Lottery is indeed more con-
ducive to regret and other emotions than the State
Lottery.
Study 4, our most important study, examined whether
these eﬀects of feedback on anticipated regret would ex-
tend to peoples decisions about lottery participation. We
did so by incorporating the notion of anticipated regret
into a larger behavioral model of reasoned action. In this
respect we built on the pioneering work of Richard, Van
der Pligt, and de Vries (1995, 1996), who were the ﬁrst to
integrate the concept of anticipated aﬀective reactions
derived from Regret Theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes &
Sugden, 1982) with an approach taken in a more general
attitude-behavior model, the Theory of Reasoned Action
(Ajzen, 1991, 1996; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Richard
et al. showed that anticipated negative aﬀective reactions
canbe clearlydiﬀerentiated fromrelatedconceptssuch as
attitudes and general aﬀective reactions. We build on this
work by studying more speciﬁcally how anticipated
regret may account for a substantial amount of variance
in behavior. According to the Theory of Reasoned Ac-
tion, behavioral decisions are best predicted by inten-
tions, and intentions are based on attitudes and
subjective norms. Building on the Richard et al. (1995,
1996) studies and the current reasoning, we propose an
extended model of reasoned action for predicting lottery
play (see Fig. 1). The model incorporates the inﬂuence of
anticipated regret on behavioral intentions. The arrow of
Lottery Type intersecting the arrow from Anticipated
Regret to Intention shows our expectation that the type
of lottery moderates the eﬀect of anticipated regret on the
intention to play the lottery. The arrow from Lottery
Type toAnticipatedRegretindicatestheexpectationthat
the feedback structure of the decision situation aﬀects the
mean levels of anticipated regret directly.
We should note here that Sheeran and Orbell (1999)
took a related, though diﬀerent approach when studying
the eﬀects of descriptive norms and anticipated regret on
intention to play the British National Lottery. They
found that regret over not playing predicted intentions,
over and above the other predictors in the theory of
reasoned action. This particular study did not address,
however, how the feedback structure of the decision
situation inﬂuences the mean levels of regret (and pos-
sibly the other factors in reasoned action), and it did not
examine the moderating eﬀect of the lottery feedback
structure, which is of crucial importance in the present
research. The expectation of feedback on non-chosen
alternatives is a central element in the anticipation of
regret. It is this particular aspect of the decision situa-
tion that we consider to be of importance for a more
complete understanding of the consequences of regret.
Attitude 
 Towards Playing the 
Lottery
Subjective Norm 
 About Playing the 
Lottery
Anticipated Regret 
 About not Playing the 
Lottery
Intention 
 To Play the Lottery
Feedback Structure 
of Lottery Type
Fig. 1. An extended model of reasoned action for lottery play.
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Method
The participants in this study were 100 citizens (50 fe-
males, 50 males; Mage ¼ 38 years, SDage ¼ 16 years, age
ranged from 15 to 84 years) of Tilburg and Uden, two
citiesinthesouthernpartoftheNetherlands.Participants
were approached at various locations in down town Til-
burg or Uden, by one of two trained male interviewers.
After having indicated their willingness to participate
they were asked if the knew the Postcode Lottery (ev-
erybody did). Next they completed a one-page question-
naire, which described the following: ‘‘You considered
playing the Postcode Lottery, but decided not to do so.
Thenitappearsthatyourpostcodeisdrawninthislottery
and thatyour neighbors winaprize. Because youdecided
not to play you win nothing.’’ After they had read this,
theyturnedoverthequestionnaireandreadtheotherside.
On this page they were asked to indicate which emotion
they would experience most intensely in this situation.
They could answer this question by naming one of 15
emotion words that were printed on the questionnaire in
alphabetical order. The emotion words that participants
could choose from were: anger, disgust, elation, envy,
fear, guilt, happiness, irritation, jealousy, pride, regret,
relief, sadness, shame, and worry. After having men-
tioned an emotion, they were asked to indicate which
emotion would be the second most intense, and then
whichwouldbethethirdmostintense.Also,participants
age was asked for(gender was coded bythe interviewers).
Results and discussion
Table 1 shows the frequency with which the partici-
pants mentioned each of the 15 emotions. Regret was
mentioned ﬁrst by a 61% majority, and in tota l by 86%
of the participants. Missing out on a prize in the Post-
code Lottery evokes feelings of regret, and to a lesser
extent also anger, irritation, jealousy, and sadness. In-
terestingly, some people also indicated that they would
feel happy, presumably because they liked the fact that
their neighbors won a large prize.
Next, emotion words received scores 1–4, for being
mentioned respectively ﬁrst, second, third, or not at all,
and we submitted these data to a ordinal principal
component analysis (implemented in SPSS). This en-
abled us to explore the relations between the diﬀerent
emotions in this particular situation. The results of this
analysis in two dimensions (based on the scree plot, both
dimensions with Eigenvalues over 1) are shown in Fig. 2.
Vectors to each of the emotion words have been plotted
to facilitate the interpretation. The length of a vector
indicates how diﬀerentiated the response pattern of that
emotion is relative to other emotions. An emotion with a
response pattern that resembles the average response
patterns of most other emotions would be located in the
middle of the plot and its vector length would approach
zero, while diﬀerentiated emotion words have long
vectors. The angle between the vectors of two emotion
words reﬂects their inter-correlation. The smaller the
angle between the vectors of two emotion words,
the higher and more positive their correlation is, with
the correlation being zero when the vectors are orthog-
onal (90), and negative when the angle is larger than
90. Thus, inspection of Fig. 2 reveals that regret is a
highly diﬀerentiated emotion (vector length), unrelated
to emotions such as anger, guilt, irritation, and pride,
and negatively correlated with emotions such as fear and
Fig. 2. Results of a principal component analysis for ordinal data on
the emotion words mentioned in Study 1.
Table 1
Named emotions in Study 1
First Second Third Total
Anger 1 12 13 26
Disgust — 134
Elation — 51 01 5
Envy 1 5 9 15
Fear — 112
Guilt 1348
Happiness 12 8 6 26
Irritation 19 17 7 43
Jealousy 4 14 19 37
Pride —— 22
Regret 61 18 7 86
Relief — 538
Sadness — 91 12 0
Shame —— 33
Worry 1258
Note. Entries are the number of times the emotions are named as
most, second most, or third most intense emotion felt when ﬁnding out
that ones postcode is the winning postcode in the Postcode Lottery,
but one did not buy a ticket (whereas ones neighbors did).
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regret.
Jointly, these ﬁndings show that regret is indeed the
dominant emotion in this context (not playing the
Postcode Lottery and not winning, while the neighbors
do on both accounts), and that the emotions jealousy
and envy are also, but to a much smaller extent induced.
In Study 2 we tested if regret would be equally intense in
case of the State Lottery.
Study 2
Method
The participants in this study were members of the
CentER-Data Telepanel of the Center for Economic
Research of Tilburg University. Members of the Tele-
panel have been provided with a personal computer and
a modem at home. Questionnaires are sent to the panel
members by modem, completed on the pc during the
weekend, and returned to CentER-Data by modem
again. The CentER-Data Telepanel is representative for
the Dutch population and consists of about 2500 people
of 18 years and older. In total 200 members (102 fe-
males, 98 males; Mage ¼ 42 years, SDage ¼ 10 years) of
the Telepanel participated in the present study.
The study had the following between-subjects facto-
rial design: 2 (Postcode Lottery vs. State Lottery) 2
(Feedback: Control vs. Neighbor Wins). There were 50
participants per cell. Participants Postcode [State] Lot-
tery conditions were asked to imagine the following
scenario: ‘‘Imagine, you have the possibility to partici-
pate in the Postcode [State] Lottery. You decide NOT to
play. You win nothing.’’ Feedback was manipulated by
asking participants in the Neighbor Wins conditions to
imagine additionally that their neighbors did decide to
play, and that they won a very big prize. In the Control
conditions they were not asked this. Participants next
indicated how much regret they would feel in that situ-
ation (1¼not at all, 9¼very much).
Results and discussion
The mean regret ratings per condition are depicted in
Table 2. A 2 2 ANOVA revealed a Lottery main eﬀect,
Fð1;196Þ¼16:94, p <: 001, and a Feedback main eﬀect,
Fð1;196Þ¼32:23, p <: 001. These eﬀects were qualiﬁed
by the predicted Lottery Feedback interaction, Fð1;
196Þ¼10:66, p <: 001. Subsequent analyses showed
that not winning a prize elicits equal amounts of antic-
ipated regret in both lotteries when there is no feedback
(i.e., the control conditions), Fð1;196Þ¼:36, ns. How-
ever, as hypothesized, participants anticipate more
regret about not winning a prize while receiving feed-
back about the neighbors winning a prize in the case
of the Postcode Lottery compared to the State Lottery,
Fð1;196Þ¼27:24, p <: 001.
These results replicated and extended the ﬁnding
from Study 1 that the particular set up of the Postcode
Lottery (i.e., even if you do not play, your postcode can
be the winning one) may amplify regret over not playing
the lottery. The results also show that a more traditional
lottery that does not provide such feedback, the State
Lottery, has a lower potential for regret.
Study 3
An important and interesting aspect in the setup of
the Postcode Lottery is that the feedback provided by
the lottery is not simply individual, but also social. One
may not only miss out on a large prize, but also ﬁnd out
that ones neighbors did win. Such social comparison
information is important in many decisions, since people
are very sensitive to the outcomes of others. Decision
makers can be extra dissatisﬁed when others receive a
better outcome. These social comparison eﬀects can also
contribute to the regret that people may feel in response
to a decision that goes awry (Boles & Messick, 1995). As
Larrick (1993) puts it:
dissatisfaction should be even greater when another persons
outcome reﬂects directly on ones own decision-making ability.
For example, if two people face the same decision but make dif-
ferent choices, then learning of the other persons superior out-
come could lead to regret and envy. (p. 447)
The ﬁndings of our Study 1, in particular those re-
sulting from the categorical principal component anal-
ysis, revealed that indeed regret and envy are empirically
(not intrinsically) related due to the fact that the Post-
code lottery oﬀers feedback about ones potential gains
even when one does not play (conducive to regret) and
that the feedback is social (conducive to jealousy and
envy). Thus, one may argue that we have been mixing
the construct regret and envy in our Study 2. This is
important since one may argue that the threat of envy
and regret may produce similar strategies in decision
makers. According to Larrick (1993):
Table 2




Postcode Lottery State Lottery
M ðSDÞ M ðSDÞ
Control 2.02a;b (1.41) 1.78a (1.22)
Neighbor wins 4.54c (2.85) 2.46b (2.07)
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, with higher scores
indicating more regret. Means with a diﬀerent superscript diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly at p <: 05.
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the other persons outcome (Brickman & Bulman, 1977). An-
other strategy is to choose the same option as the other person.
The latter prevents the possibility of doing worse, and it guar-
antees that if the outcome is misery, there will at least be com-
pany. (p. 447)
In case of the Postcode Lottery it is very hard to
avoid the feedback, since the winners of the lottery are
shown on television and live close by. But, the second
strategy could be attributable to the anticipation of re-
gret as well as the anticipation of envy. Hence it is im-
portant to understand if the speciﬁc setup of the
Postcode Lottery is also promoting envy. In order to do
so we replicated Study 2 and included measures of re-
gret, envy and jealousy. We decided to include jealousy
as well since this emotion is very much related to envy
(Parrott & Smith, 1993). Moreover, although Dutch
makes a distinction between ‘‘jealousy’’ (jaloersheid) and
‘‘envy’’ (afgunst), in everyday language the word ‘‘jalo-
ersheid’’ is used to describe a state that English native
speakers would call ‘‘envy.’’
Thus, there are theoretically and empirical (Study 1)
reasons to believe that regret and envy are related in this
context, and that the possible eﬀects of the feedback in
the Postcode Lottery may be attributed to the minimi-
zation of envy instead of regret. Therefore it is crucial to
establish that regret is evoked in case of the Postcode
Lottery and not the State Lottery, but that envy and
jealousy are evoked both in the Postcode Pottery and in
the State Lottery. Finding such a pattern of results
would demonstrate the speciﬁcity of the feedback
structure of the Postcode Lottery to the emotion of re-
gret, and it would support the discriminant validity of
the latter.
Method
This study had the same design and scenario as Study
2. Participants, 18 per cel, were 72 undergraduate psy-
chology students (56 females, 16 males; Mage ¼ 22 years,
SDage ¼ 3 years) at Tilburg University. They partici-
pated in partial fulﬁllment of a course requirement.
Participants rated the amount of regret, envy, and jeal-
ousy they would feel (1¼not at all, 9¼very much).
Results
The regret, envy, and jealousy ratings were submitted
to 2 2 ANOVAs. The results are shown in Table 3 and
described in detail below.
Regret
This analysis clearly replicated the ﬁndings of Study
2. The analysis revealed a Lottery main eﬀect, Fð1;68Þ¼
7:06, p <: 01, and a Feedback main eﬀect, Fð1;68Þ¼
142:91, p <: 001, which were qualiﬁed by the predicted
Lottery Feedback interaction, Fð1;168Þ¼12:55,
p <: 001. Subsequent analyses showed that not winning
a prize elicits equal amounts of anticipated regret in
both lotteries when there is no feedback (i.e., the feed-
back control conditions), Fð1;68Þ¼:39, ns. However,
as hypothesized, participants anticipate more regret
about not winning a prize while receiving feedback
about the neighbors winning a prize in the case of the
Postcode Lottery compared to the State Lottery,
Fð1;68Þ¼19:21, p <: 001.
Envy
As predicted, the results for envy were quite diﬀerent.
Here the analysis only showed a Feedback main eﬀect,
Fð1;68Þ¼31:96, p <: 001, such that more envy would
be felt when the neighbors win a large prize
(MFeedback Present ¼ 4:61), compared to when there is no
information about the neighbors (MFeedback Absent ¼
2:11). The Lottery main eﬀect, Fð1;68Þ¼:02 and the
Lottery Feedback interaction, Fð1;168Þ¼:77, were
clearly not signiﬁcant.
Jealousy
The results for jealousy were quite the same as those
for envy. The analysis again only showed a main eﬀect
for Feedback, Fð1;68Þ¼98:48, p <: 001, indicating
more jealousy when there was feedback present about
the neighbors winning a prize (M ¼ 6:50) than when
feedback was absent (M ¼ 2:33). The Lottery main ef-
fect, Fð1;68Þ¼:16 and the Lottery Feedback inter-
action, Fð1;168Þ¼:86, were both non-signiﬁcant.
Discussion
The results of this study again show that the speciﬁc
structure of the Postcode Lottery, may amplify regret.
At the same time, however, the study also shows that
Table 3




Postcode Lottery State Lottery
M ðSDÞ M ðSDÞ
Regret
Control 1.56a (1.29) 1.89a (1.08)
Neighbor wins 7.39c (1.38) 5.06b (2.34)
Envy
Control 1.94a (1.59) 2.28a (1.71)
Neighbor wins 4.83b (2.12) 4.39b (2.03)
Jealousy
Control 2.06a (1.59) 2.61a (1.85)
Neighbor wins 6.61b (1.79) 6.39b (1.88)
Note. Ratings were made on a 9-point scale, with higher scores
indicating more regret, envy, and jealousy. Means per emotion with a
diﬀerent superscript diﬀer signiﬁcantly at p <: 05.
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envy and jealousy, two emotions that are relevant in the
context of lotteries, especially when one may compare
oneself to winners. However, for envy and jealousy the
ampliﬁcation occurs irrespective of the type of lottery.
Envy and jealousy are ampliﬁed as soon as one hears
about neighbors winning a large prize in a lottery. Re-
gret is only ampliﬁed if this feedback information re-
ﬂects on the choice that one had made earlier. Thus, it
also showed that only regret, and not envy and jealousy,
shows the across-lottery diﬀerences. Hence, envy and
jealousy could not explain possible across-lottery dif-
ferences in participation.
Taken together, the results of the ﬁst three studies
clearly provide support for the notion that the Postcode
Lotterymayinducefeelingsofanticipatedregret,moreso
that the State Lottery. In the introduction we argued that
this particular aspect of the Postcode Lottery could mo-
tivate consumers to play the lottery. This speciﬁc, crucial
prediction was tested in Study 4, in which both Postcode
Lottery players and State Lottery players were surveyed.
Study 4
Method
The study had a two-group design (Participant plays
in:PostcodeLotteryvs.StateLottery).Participantswere,
asinStudy2,membersoftheCentER-DataTelepanel.In
total 400 panel members were selected for the present
study (158 females, 242 males; Mage ¼ 50 years, SDage ¼
13 years). Two hundred of the participants played in the
Postcode Lottery, the other two hundred in the State
Lottery. None of them had participated in Study 2.
The questionnaire was based on the research by
Richard et al. (1996) , and included measures of attitude,
subjective norms, anticipated regret, and behavioral in-
tentions with respect to playing the Postcode Lottery or
the State Lottery. Attitude was measured by having
participants evaluate playing in the Postcode Lottery or
in State Lottery on three 9-point semantic diﬀerential
scales: pleasant–unpleasant, good–bad, nice–awful.
These were combined in a 9-point scale (a ¼ :88), with
higher numbers indicating a more favorable attitude.
Subjective norm was measured by the following two
questions (a ¼ :57): ‘‘If I would participate in the Post-
code Lottery [State Lottery], most people and organi-
zations that are important to me would ﬁnd this’’
(1¼very negative, 9¼very positive), ‘‘Most people and
organizations that are important to me would recom-
mend me to participate in the Postcode Lottery [State
Lottery]’’ (1¼absolutely not, 9¼very much so). Antic-
ipated regret was measured by asking participants to
indicate how much regret they would feel when they
decided NOT to play and discovered that their neighbor
did play and won a very big prize (1¼not at all, 9¼very
much). Behavioral intention (a ¼ :44) was measured by
asking how likely it was that they would participate in
the Postcode Lottery [State Lottery] in the coming
months (1¼not very likely, 9¼very likely), and by
asking them whether they would participate when ex-
plicitly asked by letter or over the telephone (1¼not
very likely, 9¼very likely).
3
Results
Table 4 shows the mean scores on the dependent
variables for the Postcode Lottery players and the State
Lottery players. A MANOVA with lottery condition
(Postcode Lottery vs. State Lottery) as the independent
variable and the scales as dependent variables revealed a
signiﬁcant multivariate diﬀerence between the two con-
ditions, Fð4;395Þ¼49:49, p <: 001. More importantly,
univariate tests showed that a signiﬁcant diﬀerence ex-
isted for 2 of the 4 ratings (see Table 4). The two groups
did not diﬀer with respect to subjective norm and be-
havioral intention, but they did so with respect to atti-
tude and anticipated regret. The attitude toward playing
the lottery was less positive for Postcode Lottery players
than for State Lottery players. This less positive attitude
towards the Postcode Lottery may suggest that people
dislike being put in the position in which they may end
up regretting their decision not to play. Or it suggests
that there may be other motivations underlying the
participation in this lottery. Anticipation of future regret
can be such a motivation. In support of our reasoning,
Postcode Lottery players anticipate signiﬁcantly more
regret over not playing (M ¼ 6:39) than do State Lottery
players (M ¼ 3:07).
Regression analyses
Did anticipated regret indeed predict the behavioral
intention? In order to test this we regressed the behav-
ioral intention on attitude, subjective norm, and antici-
pated regret, for the Postcode Lottery players and the
State Lottery players separately. We used the hierar-
chical procedure and entered attitude and subjective
norm in the ﬁrst step and anticipated regret in the sec-
ond step. The results are shown in Table 5. Step 1 of
both regression analyses shows that the behavioral in-
tention can be predicted on the basis of attitude,
whereas subjective norm does not signiﬁcantly add to
the prediction. These ﬁndings are consistent with those
of Sheeran and Orbell (1999), who found that, while
3 The Theory of Reasoned Action is aimed at predicting behavioral
intentions. There is strong evidence, however, that behavioral expec-
tations are better predictions of behavior than behavioral intentions
(Hartwick, Sheppard, & Warshaw, 1988), and hence measures of
behavioral intentions are often replaced by measures of behavioral
expectations. We have followed this approach.
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were no reliable eﬀects for subjective norm.
In support of our hypothesis, when anticipated regret
was entered on Step 2 of the regression analysis, only the
ﬁt of the model for the Postcode Lottery increased sig-
niﬁcantly. That is, in the case of the Postcode Lottery
the b of anticipated regret was signiﬁcant and almost as
large as that of attitude. In the case of the State Lottery
the b of anticipated regret was not signiﬁcant, and the ﬁt
of the model did not improve by adding this variable.
Next, we performed a direct test of the diﬀerences
between the bs for anticipated regret obtained in the
regression analyses reported in Table 5. We did this by
regressingthebehavioralintention onattitude,subjective
norm and anticipated regret, using the whole sample
(N ¼ 400). This analysis also included a dummy variable
(1,0) for lottery condition and a term for the interaction
between lottery condition and anticipated regret. As
expected, this interaction was signiﬁcant, b ¼ :202;
tð394Þ¼2:03, p <: 05, clearly demonstrating the diﬀer-
ential impact of anticipated regret in both lotteries.
Discussion
In this ﬁnal study we adopted a quasi-experimental
design, using actual lottery players, in order to compare
the factors that might motivate people to play the
Postcode Lottery and the State Lottery. We combined
the correlational approach that has been successful in
showing the potential impact of anticipated regret in
causing behavior, with the natural manipulation of lot-
tery structure. The results of this study support the
prediction that anticipated regret is an important factor
in decisions to play the Postcode Lottery, but not in the
State Lottery, over and above the eﬀects that other de-
terminants of Reasoned Action, such as attitude and
subjective norm have. It establishes the discriminant
validity of anticipated regret relative to related deter-
minants of decision-making, and its pragmatic relevance
for real life decisions.
We need to acknowledge that although the partici-
pants are drawn from a panel that is representative for
the Dutch population, we cannot rule out some sort of
self-selection. It may be the case that people who end up
playing the Postcode Lottery are more inclined to feel
regret, or to anticipate regret, in comparison to people
who do not play at all or play in other lotteries. In other
words, there could be individual diﬀerences that explain
or covary with our ﬁndings. If this were to be the case, it
would still be consistent with our reasoning that regret
may promote playing the postcode lottery, but the im-
plications of our ﬁndings would then be limited to those
individuals who score high on such a ‘‘regret proneness’’
scale. Still, the ﬁndings of Study 3 are consistent with the
Table 5
Results of regressions analyses predicting behavioral intention for Postcode Lottery players and for State Lottery players in Study 4
Predictor Postcode Lottery State Lottery
b tpb tp
Model 1
1. Attitude .365 5.47 .001 .222 3.01 .003
2. Subjective norm .066 .98 .326 .126 1.71 .089
Model 2
1. Attitude .313 4.85 .001 .227 3.08 .002
2. Subjective norm .102 1.59 .113 .117 1.59 .114
3. Anticipated regret .291 4.54 .001 .095 1.39 .164
Model 2 ﬁt
R2;Fð3;196Þ;p .226 19.112 .001 .096 6.934 .001
Model 2 improvement
R2;Fð1;196Þ;p .081 20.601 .001 .009 1.947 .164
Table 4
Means and standard deviations of measures for Postcode Lottery players and for State Lottery players in Study 4
Dependent variables Postcode Lottery State Lottery F(1,398) p
M ðSDÞ M ðSDÞ
Attitude 6.44 (1.76) 7.05 (1.15) 11.891 .001
Subjective norm 5.82 (1.45) 5.79 (1.19) .029 .865
Anticipated regret 6.39 (2.66) 3.07 (2.40) 171.224 .001
Behavioral intention 6.35 (2.29) 6.42 (2.17) .098 .754
Note. All variables range from 1 to 9.
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signment. A second potential limitation that stems from
the usage of real lottery participants is that the correla-
tional nature of the data does not allow real causal
conclusions. It could, for example, be the case that the
people who are not likely to play during the coming
months (those who had a low behavioral intention), were
able to convince themselves that they would not regret it
when their postcode would be drawn during these
months. We think this is not likely, but even if were the
case, it would underscore the relation between the an-
ticipation of regret and playing the Postcode Lottery. A
ﬁnal limitation of the present study stems from the fact
that we did not include measures of envy and jealousy.
Although Study 3 showed that the speciﬁc structure of
the Postcode Lottery (and not the of the State Lottery) is
especially conducive to regret, we cannot rule out the
possibility that envy and jealousy are predictors of lot-
tery play (in both lotteries) or draw conclusions about
the between lottery diﬀerences in these relations.
General discussion
Regret is felt when we realize in retrospect that we
should have chosen diﬀerently. Feedback information
about what would have happened had we chosen dif-
ferently is therefore a crucial factor in regret. The present
research has shown, in a series of four studies, that a
speciﬁc lottery that provides such information to their
(potential) players, the Postcode Lottery, may evoke
anticipations of regret and that these anticipations may
hence inﬂuence participation decisions. Interestingly, a
lottery that does not provide such feedback, in our study
the Dutch National State Lottery, did not show the same
potential for evoking regret. Moreover, no relation be-
tween anticipations of regret and lottery play was found
for this lottery. As such, our research has documented
the consequences of regret aversion for lottery play, a
frequently made real life decision. Moreover, it has
shown how this inﬂuence of anticipated regret on deci-
sion-making is conditional upon the feedback structure
of the decision situation, and independent of potential
other determinants of decision-making in real life such as
attitudes and subjective norms.
Below we discuss our ﬁndings in relation to other
types of gambling. We also address the implications of
our ﬁndings for current discussions about the relation
between regret and risk aversion, the role of regret in the
action sequence and the regrets following actions and
inactions.
Regret and gambling
The concept of regret thus appears to be an important
factor in lottery play. And the current studies under-
score the relevance of feedback information about non-
chosen courses of action as a crucial factor. This fear for
unpleasant knowledge of ‘‘what would have been’’ may
explain more types of gambling behavior. Let us
describe just a few.
In a recently introduced lottery in the Netherlands,
called Dayzers, a similar anticipated regret argument
may apply. In this lottery, part of your lucky number is
a date (e.g., 01-13) that you pick yourself. The orga-
nizers stimulate you to play with dates that are impor-
tant to you, like your birthday, your wedding day, or the
birthday of your children. Of course, one of your dates
may be picked, even when you do not play. The reali-
zation of this fact may urge you to play, similar to what
happens in the Postcode Lottery. However, what we
think could be a crucial diﬀerence between Dayzers and
the Postcode Lottery is that the potential feedback in
Dayzers may be less threatening. Since the organizers
stimulate you to play with multiple dates, they indeed
increase the probability of regret (Ritov, 1996). At the
same time the potential regret may be explained away
much easier, causing the regret to be less threatening.
Although many dates may be important to you (e.g.,
birthday, wedding day, birthday of partners or children,
the day that Elvis permanently ‘‘left the building’’), it
seems foolish to play with all of them. The mere fact of
having to make a selection may be enough to realize that
it is unavoidable that one day one of your dates will be
selected in this lottery. This realization of the inesca-
pability of regret may take away the urge to play in
order to prevent it. Because of this, we conjecture that
anticipated regret of not-playing Dayzers would be
lower than of not-playing the Postcode Lottery, and that
anticipated regrets inﬂuence on participation in the
former is smaller as well.
Some of the success of slot machines, as noted by
Larrick and Boles (1995, p. 89, footnote 2), may also
stem from regret inducing tactics. Slot machines are
often designed such that one could play with more coins,
enabling more winning combinations. Players will al-
ways see these combinations, also when not to playing
them. This could lead to severe regret, upon noticing
that one would have won if one had paid more. The
regret-minimizing strategy thus would be to play with
more coins. Likewise, players who stop and see the next
player win, may feel regret of having waited insuﬃ-
ciently for the machine to start paying back.
The casino card game of blackjack may also be rele-
vant here. In blackjack the players play against the
dealer and the objective of the players is to obtain a
greater total than the dealer, but not more than 21. If
the total value of the cards exceeds 21, players bust and
lose their bet. Wagenaar (1988) studied 112 blackjack
players and found that they play very conservatively and
adopt strategies that avoid busting. They may do so in
order to avoid regret. Regret over busting may be more
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because the dealer has higher total. Passing ‘‘the control
to over the outcome to the dealer can thus minimise the
possible regret’’ (Wagenaar, 1988, p. 24). Studies by
Taylor (1989, 1991; unpublished but described in Miller
& Taylor, 1995) are consistent with these ideas.
Finally, Loftus and Loftus (1985) proposed a regret
mechanism to account for excessive video game play-
ing. In their book about the psychology of video games
they argue that the experience of regret may be an
important factor in decisions to continue playing video
games:
In most situations regret is something that you just have to live
with. But that is not true with video games. Often when playing
a video game, the game ends because youve made a mistake,
and you immediately know exactly what youve done wrong.
‘‘If only I hadnt eaten the energizer in this game before trying
to grab that cherry,’’ you say to yourself. ‘‘I knew it was the
wrong thing to do, and I did it anyway.’’ But now you dont
have to sit there being annoyed and frustrated. Instead you
can play the game again and correct the mistake. So in goes an-
other quarter. But in the process of playing again, you make an-
other mistake. And spend another quarter to correct it. And so
it goes. (p. 30)
In sum, the anticipation of future regret and the ex-
perience of regret stemming from earlier play may both
inﬂuence peoples future gambling decisions. This emo-
tion may thus play an important role in the psychology
of gambling.
Regret aversion vs. risk aversion
The fact that the anticipation of future regret pro-
motes lottery play and other gambling behaviors is also
interesting for the question whether regret promotes risk
aversion. Risk aversion is expressed by preferring a safe
option to a risky option with the same expected value.
For example, in a choice between $50 for certain (safe
option) or $100 depending on whether a coin falls on
heads or on tails (risky option), people often prefer the
safe option. Playing the lottery has the same underlying
structure. Not playing provides one with a certain out-
come (safe option) and playing provides one with an
uncertain outcome (risky option). One either looses the
prize of the ticket or wins a prize.
Although wisdom tells us to ‘‘better be safe than
sorry,’’ research has provided evidence for both risk
avoiding and risk seeking tendencies as a consequence of
the anticipation of regret. Larrick and Boles (1995) were
the ﬁrst to ﬁnd that the anticipation of regret might
actually promote risky (or better, less risk averse) oﬀers
in a negotiation context. Ritov (1996) found such risk
seeking tendencies in choices between gambles. Zeelen-
berg et al. (1996; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997) showed
that people are regret averse (rather than risk-averse)
and that they are therefore motivated to make regret-
minimizing choices. Regret-minimizing choices may be
either risk-avoiding or risk-seeking. The expectation of
future feedback information about the diﬀerent courses
of action will determine which of these are regret-mini-
mizing. The current ﬁndings are consistent with these
earlier ones and show that also in real life the antici-
pation of regret stemming from possible future feedback
may promote risky behavior (playing the lottery, with
an uncertain outcome) over safer ones (keeping ones
money in the pocket).
Regret in the action sequence
The implications of our ﬁndings go beyond the eﬀects
of regret on gambling. The fact that anticipated regret
may promote participation and ‘‘lock’’ people in their
current behavior, suggests that it is worthwhile to view
decisions not in isolation, but instead embedded in an
action sequence. In such a sequence possible actions are
taken into consideration, evaluated, chosen and ﬁnally
implemented, all in relation to prior and future behav-
iors and outcomes. Thus far, only few studies have in-
vestigated the more dynamic aspects of regret. Recently,
Zeelenberg, Van den Bos, Van Dijk, and Pieters (2002)
found that after a past behavior had led to negative
outcomes, a change of the behavior that led again to
negative outcomes was generally less regretful than a
continuation of the past behavior that led to the same
negative outcomes. In other words, active attempts to
avoid future losses after the past losses had materialized
were considered least regretful, independent of the va-
lence of the outcomes. Zeelenberg et al. examined re-
peated choices in scenarios about football coaches
winning or losing games. The duration of events such as
football games is ﬁxed and outside the coaches control,
and after ending the outcomes of the games are (usually)
certain. Yet, in many other cases the duration of events
is under behavioral control, and under such conditions
the gains and losses materialize only when the decision-
maker decides to end the event. This condition occurs,
for instance, in the stock market where investors deter-
mine when to sell winning or losing stocks. The antici-
pation of regret may play an important role in
investment decisions, not only in what but also in when
to buy or sell stocks. It has been commonly observed
that investors tend to hang on too long to losing stocks
(Shefrin & Statman, 1985), which may partly be ac-
countable to regret-minimizing strategies. Investors
might wait to sell stocks that have gone down in order to
avoid the pain and regret of having made a bad in-
vestment. As long as the stock is retained the ﬁnancial
loss is virtual and has not materialized yet, and the stock
may still go up and regret may not be experienced (yet).
However, in their eﬀort to avoid current regrets, such
investors may increase the likelihood of future regrets.
These investors mimic Postcode Lottery participants,
who minimize current and future regrets by sticking to
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conditions the motivation to minimize regret may in fact
increase the likelihood that it experienced in the long
run, which we believe to be an important avenue for
further research.
Implications for action and inaction eﬀects
A recurring issue in the psychology of regret is the
question of whether we regret actions more than inac-
tions. Although it has been repeatedly found that ac-
tions produce more regret than inactions, this
conclusion has not gone unchallenged (Baron & Ritov,
1994; Connolly & Reb, 2003; Feldman, Miyamoto, &
Loftus, 1999; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995; Prentice &
Koehler, 2003; Zeelenberg et al., 2002). The present re-
search speaks to this discussion. We do need to keep in
mind though, that in most studies ‘‘The consequences
[of action and inaction] are precisely known and pre-
cisely matched, the regretted outcome is recent, and
the emotion may be fairly intense’’ (Kahneman, 1995,
p. 389). In this respect our study resembles more the
studies that focused on action and inaction regrets in
daily life, where such control is absent, and action vs.
inaction may be confounded with other factors (Feld-
man et al., 1999; Gilovich & Medvec, 1995).
Keeping that in mind, our results show that the an-
ticipation of regret can clearly promote action (i.e.,
playing the lottery), and that the extent to which action
is promoted is contingent on the speciﬁc structure of the
lottery (i.e., the presence or absence of feedback). For
people who did not play the Postcode Lottery yet (in-
action), receiving feedback that the neighbors had won
was regret promoting (Studies 2 and 3). For people who
played the Postcode Lottery but not for people who
played the State Lottery, the anticipation of regret
promoted continuation of participation (Study 4). In
other words, in the situation that ones postcode is se-
lected to be the winning postcode in the Postcode Lot-
tery, inaction was more regret promoting than action.
Yet, at the same time, the present research starts to
disentangle action/inaction eﬀects and status quo eﬀects.
Continuing playing the lottery is an action in compari-
son to not playing, but at the same time it is a decision
to stick to the status quo, as compared to switching. Our
research thus underscores recent research ﬁndings that
call into question the universal link between action vs.
inaction and regret. It indicates that the link is depen-
dent upon the speciﬁcs of the decision context (here, the
absence or presence of feedback information).
Coda
Before closing, let us return to one of the major
questions that motivated our current research. Could we
ﬁnd support in real life decision-making for the opera-
tion of an anticipated regret mechanism? The current
studies show an anticipated regret eﬀect in lottery par-
ticipation decisions. Moreover, it shows that these ef-
fects are dependent on the feedback structure of the
lotteries. By adopting a full-cycle approach—taking re-
search out of the laboratory and showing the contin-
gency of regret on expected feedback about non-chosen
alternatives—these studies broadened the scope of regret
research. The current research also makes evident the
possibility of using (or abusing) the psychological
mechanisms of regret aversion and the associated feed-
back avoidance as potential powerful inﬂuence tactics.
Hence, this research clearly demonstrates one of the
consequences of regret aversion in real life.
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